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Migrants and (In)tolerant Discourses in Greek politics

Hara Kouki and Anna Triandafyllidou
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ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES**

Migrants and (In)tolerance Discourses in Greek politics

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ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES**

**Work Package 4 – National Case Studies of
Challenges to Tolerance in Political Life**

**D4.1 Final Country Reports on Concepts and
Practices of Tolerance Addressing Cultural Diversity
in Political Life**

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Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion: Responding to the Challenges of the 21st Century in Europe (ACCEPT PLURALISM)

ACCEPT PLURALISM is a Research Project, funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Program. The project investigates whether European societies have become more or less tolerant during the past 20 years. In particular, the project aims to clarify: (a) how is tolerance defined conceptually, (b) how it is codified in norms, institutional arrangements, public policies and social practices, (c) how tolerance can be measured (whose tolerance, who is tolerated, and what if degrees of tolerance vary with reference to different minority groups). The ACCEPT PLURALISM consortium conducts original empirical research on key issues in school life and in politics that thematise different understandings and practices of tolerance. Bringing together empirical and theoretical findings, ACCEPT PLURALISM generates a State of the Art Report on Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe, a Handbook on Ideas of Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe, a Tolerance Indicators' Toolkit where qualitative and quantitative indicators may be used to score each country's performance on tolerating cultural diversity, and several academic publications (books, journal articles) on Tolerance, Pluralism and Cultural Diversity in Europe. The ACCEPT PLURALISM consortium is formed by 18 partner institutions covering 15 EU countries. The project is hosted by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and co-ordinated by Prof. Anna Triandafyllidou.

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Executive Summary

During the last 20 years the country has been rapidly transformed from a migrant sending to a migrant receiving country and currently about 0.8 million of its 11 million population is of foreign origin. Moreover, during the last three years Greece has been faced with a European and international migration crisis: while increasing numbers of people are fleeing war and poverty from Asia and Africa, the Greek Turkish border has become the main gate to Europe. The onset of the current financial crisis in early 2010 has deteriorated the situation. Unemployment grew dramatically among long term settled immigrants and working class natives. There has been an important increase in the crime rate and a generalized sense of insecurity in the centre of the capital of the country, while adding to this, extreme right wing groups have taken the situation 'in their hands'. Departing from images and incidents taking place in the centre of Athens, an all the more xenophobic discourse started spreading and dominating the way public opinion interprets the 'other' living in the city. Large parts of society appear as prone to morally accept incidents of racist violence and hate speech.

Central to this change has been the unprecedented rise of far right parties, actions and discourse in the public sphere. LAOS (The People's Orthodox Rally), is considered to be an extreme right wing formation that won 5.63% of the vote in 2009 national elections and 7.14% for the elections for the European Parliament. LAOS has participated in the provisional grand coalition government formed to deal with the crisis (from November 2011 till February 2012) thus further legitimising its position in the Greek political system. Golden Dawn, on the other hand, is a nationalist far right organization, whose members have been repeatedly accused of carrying out acts of violence and hate crimes against immigrants, political opponents and ethnic minorities. Golden Dawn, with a clear racist and Nazi political position, operates in certain 'troubled' urban areas in terms of 'field work' and establishes a state within a state offering security to local residents. This radical organization won a seat in municipal elections in the city of Athens (5.3%) and entered the parliament in 2012 national elections getting an 6,97% of the national vote.

This re-composition of the extreme right in the country runs in parallel with a conservative unfolding of Greek identity and a generalized political crisis unfolding in the 1990s, since when sensitive issues of national identity have re emerged and national particularities surfaced as the opposite pole to reform and globalization. Such a tendency appears severely intensified during the current crisis. However, the relationship and dynamics between the extreme right discourse and mainstream public opinion, party and official state discourse in Greece has not been thoroughly studied.

This study explores the recent discourses on diversity and tolerance in Greek political life. It investigates what has been defined by different political actors as intolerable, tolerable or acceptable cultural difference – hence it questions what intolerance/tolerance/acceptance means for each actor and how they re-define and use it to draw boundaries in Greek society. These boundaries cut across and overlap with different dimensions: natives/nationals and Others/aliens, tolerant and intolerant people/parties, racist and non-racist, democratic and authoritarian, right wing vs. left wing forces.

We examine here the political and discursive deployment of toleration in two different case studies and see how tolerance relies on the construction of images of 'ingroup' and 'outgroup'. Our main scope is to gain a better understanding of why and when some aspects of difference are rejected. We seek to answer the question what kind of difference is tolerable/acceptable in Greek society and why? We also examine whether Greek society is becoming more or less tolerant towards specific groups and why.

Case studies

The first case analysed in this study refers to the public prayer of Muslim inhabitants of Athens on 18 November 2010 on the occasion of the 'Id festivity (end of Ramadan) before the sprawling courtyard of the country's main university as a peaceful protest for the non existence of an official mosque (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2009; Antoniou 2005); this protest event provoked a public debate, the first on the issue to acquire visibility at the national level and took place without problems.

The second case study concentrates on a tragic event that took place a few months later. In May 2011, in the very centre of Athens a 44-year old man, Manolis Kantaris, was cold blood assassinated by unknown people, believed to be irregular migrants. This murder triggered a series of violent and racist attacks against migrants in the city centre, and especially the 6th city council district that were led by far right wing organizations, such as the Golden Dawn, and tolerated by both the police and part of the residents of the area. These incidents, our second case study, produced a polarised political discourse focusing around the crisis in the city centre as linked with the issue of irregular immigration.

In those two cases, the social practice of toleration was played out in the historical centre of the capital, where deterioration of living conditions has been followed by considerable irregular migration flows. The above events have generated discussions and conflicts in national politics regarding more generally migrants and the immigrant 'Other' in Greek society and the limit of his/her presence in public. While the political and symbolic exclusion of the immigrant Other is nothing new in Greek society, what is new is how concepts of tolerance/intolerance and actions of toleration or lack of toleration are newly negotiated amidst a generalized economic and political crisis. The emergence of migration as a centre-stage political issue in the last two years and the spectacular rise of the far right wing vote (role of far right parties brings these questions and by the emergence of far right parties strong enough to win seats in the Parliament and in Athens municipal council. These political developments have brought racist and intolerant discourse (and actions) centre-stage in the debate on migration.

Methodology

Our case study included both desk research and empirical fieldwork. We have analysed the scholarly literature on the issue of the far right in the country, while also collecting material on far right wing parties and groups active at the moment in the city centre. We also examined newspaper materials: We searched for articles in five mainstream newspapers with the highest circulation at the national level (notably Kathimerini, Vima, Eleftherotypia, Ethnos, ta Nea) and in a selection of far right groups' websites. Moreover, we examined how the major political parties present in the Greek Parliament in 2011 (Conservative party New Democracy, Socialist party PASOK, left wing party SYRIZA, the Greek Communist Party KKE, the far right wing party LAOS and the Golden Dawn party that was not represented in the national parliament but whose actions and discourse were important for our selected case studies.

Desk material, thus, has been used so as to set the picture of the events and positions taken, while our object of analysis were qualitative interviews conducted with actors actively engaged in the events under question. We have conducted 19 qualitative interviews with representatives of right and left wing parties and groups, with migrant associations active in the events aforementioned, journalists, writers and with residents of the city centre that have not taken active part in those conflicts but see themselves affected by immigrants' presence.

Key Findings

There are two competing positions emerging from the interviews: Tolerance of Diversity-Intolerance of Racism and Intolerance of Diversity/ Islamophobia- Tolerance/ Justification of Racism, correspond to two competing framings, the political/ ideological and the cultural/ identity one.

More precisely, those arguing along a political/ ideological frame sustain a tolerant position towards diversity and an intolerant one when it comes to racist words and acts. Even if only one interviewee explicitly attributed her choice to a 'leftist' ideology, however, all respondents defended what we could call 'new left' values such as minorities' rights, equality and diversity according to a 'left/ right cleavage'. Tolerance is endorsed in the name of this framing, but at the same time is proved limited to reflect accommodation of diversity in contemporary multicultural settings. Racism is perceived as a problem not to be tolerated and respondents attempt to erase the differences raised between 'us' and 'them' situating the framing on the 'them' tag of the 'us/ them' cleavage.

Those framing the events as cultural/ identity issues, on the contrary, put forward the 'intolerance of diversity' position, while justifying if not tolerating racist attitudes. The latter category insist on the non political/ ideological nature of their standpoint and present it as apolitical, as a non option, but, instead as a natural reaction to the problem of migration. Within this framing, racism is a mere symptom of the problem of migration and tolerance accepted in theory but severely limited in practice due to the 'us/ them' dichotomy. Prioritizing national identity and culture, thus, those frames could be situated on the 'us' tag along an 'us/ them' cleavage and on the 'right' tag of the 'left/right' cleavage as they prioritize national cultural identity over the 'other's' rights, without questioning their liberal values and beliefs in a modern society.

Both frames use the law and order master frame, as well as the anti establishment critique frame, so as to develop their competing positions. For instance, state migration policies have been either lacking or inefficient and EU regulations contributed to the explosion of the problem. Concerning particularly the city centre, many of our respondents, including party representatives and the extreme right representative, claim that the first to blame is not the migrants themselves, but the state, along with all parliamentary parties, politicians and authorities, that did nothing to prevent or deal with the issue. Moving even further, the populist right representative puts the blame for uncontrolled migration to the exploitation of the Third World countries by the multinational companies and the dominant economy.

Those arguing for intolerance through the law and order master frame examine the 'lamentable' phenomenon of massive immigration in terms of the effects on local people, public image and economy, without taking into account the rights of the immigrants themselves, or without rating 'their' rights equally with 'ours'. The victims of criminality and lawlessness are first and foremost local residents of the central areas of Athens. Even if respondents acknowledge that immigrants' rights are abused, however their public presence in the area puts native people's security further at risk as this is already the case due to economic harsh situation- using in the same way the crisis frame. So, even if the law and order frame is presented as a non political way to classify and understand social reality, it is however constructed in ethnocultural terms that define the political identities of 'us' vs 'them' in the national public sphere.

In the same way, the critique of political power that both frames share, presupposes different understandings of what is the 'problem' and who is considered to be the perpetrator, the agent of change and the possible solutions. The cultural/ identity frame attributes the role of the agent of change to the state; at the same time, however, it constructs 'them' as a homogeneous category that is so different than the national self that co existence becomes a cultural

problem. So, the dominant culture is not to blame, while it remains unclear how the state could have resolved what seems to be natural conflicts and unbridgeable cultural differences.

Even if respondents pay lip service to tolerance during the interview, the solutions suggested through this frame are quite intolerant. In other words, there is an inconsistency between the goals formulated on the one hand and the analysis of the problems that require a solution on the other. For instance, the representative of the radical right party attributes the problem of the public prayer to state's neglect over building a Mosque; soon afterwards, however, he denies any possibility of tolerating Muslim culture, a culture that rejects women's rights. While both positions include the same criticism against power, voiced even by those representing power structures, however, the cultural/ identity frame attacks power holders in the name of quite different criteria as it is framed in ethnocultural terms.

Across Europe and along with the rise and gradual legitimisation of ultra right wing rhetoric, hate speech is often disguised in the name of liberal values so as to exclude individuals from citizens' liberal rights. A new principled intolerance is seen, paradoxically, as necessary to protect the rights of individuals, and the rights, values and the identity of the majority. Greece is experiencing (already in the past years but particularly so in spring 2012) an unprecedented rise of far right parties, along with a notable spreading of incidents of racist violence and xenophobic discourse in the public sphere. The actual presence of the 'other' in need next to the nationals, who are also through a time of crisis, renders the issue of tolerance into a central political challenge to be thoroughly examined.

The contradictory diagnoses of the 'problem' notably the political and principled framing of the problems by reference to tolerance (if not necessarily acceptance) of diversity and rejection of racism; and the identity framing where all issues are subsumed to a fundamental dichotomy between Us and Others (we cannot tolerate others if their presence is perceived to harm our material or cultural well being. There are no principles that hold here – the interest of the 'ingroup' is the utmost priority) are however solved by the strategy of objectification.

Our frame analysis suggests that competing versions of reality and of the 'good' are reconciled by presenting 'intolerance' positions as apolitical and logical reactions towards an 'objective' reality. Thus, with the exception of a few clearly left-wing and pro-diversity interviewees, most others, including those who would classify themselves as faithful to equality and democracy, use the law and order frame to justify and legitimize intolerance and racism. This strategy of objectification is also adopted to strengthen the culture and identity frame: it is 'natural' that the world is divided into 'us' fellow nationals and 'them' others. Exclusion, inequality, intolerance, even racist violence can be justified when what is at stake is the perceived interest or well being of the national ingroup. We may call this type of intolerance as the new nationalist intolerance. What is particularly worrying in Greece is that such discourses of principled national intolerance (and racism) are increasingly seen as justified and legitimized by reference to an 'objective' reality. They thus push the far right wing discourses centre-stage.

Keywords

New radical right, intolerance, racism, violence, far right, migrants

1. Introduction

The present report engages into a study of the limits of tolerance towards diversity in Greece for the period 2010-2011. Not pertaining to the traditional migrant host countries, Greece has experienced since 1990s a wave of migration flux that has severely intensified in the last three years, along with incidents of racist violence. Moreover, the country has been since 2010 the centre of a severe financial crisis that has hit Europe having an overwhelming impact on the living conditions of the totality of its inhabitants. It seems, thus, as an ideal case to study so as to look at how meaningful the concept of tolerance is during a period when certainties about liberal public life are being rapidly shattered and how its use is embedded in the negotiation of the national self and the ‘other’.

1.1 Tolerance and Xenophobia in Europe

Today the concept of tolerance is commonly defined as the realm of differences which are not approved but should be tolerated mainly for principles, such as freedom of opinion or freedom of religion, which are constitutive for the political culture of benevolent nationalism. The so called **space of tolerance** is made up when there are things that we have reasons to reject and to see as wrong or able to cause harm, but not to forbid or censure, or, when reasons not to forbid or censure are stronger than reasons to do so (Brown, 2006). Against this background, tolerance became in the postwar era an inherent feature of decent politics taking the character of a social contract with minorities, which were given a secure status within the nation state (Schiffauer, 2012, forthcoming). In parallel with that, societal and political actors in liberal democratic societies, including even sections of the extreme right, reject racism and discrimination as normatively objectionable.

However, it seems that currently the pendulum sways in a different direction. The limits of toleration are re-emphasized and drawn narrower. Since the 1980s, new Right and neo-conservative ideas have become more prominent in Europe, with their emphasis upon ideas such as the right to difference, anti-egalitarianism and anti-universalism. The migration issue has marked a recomposition of extreme right, which has experienced during the last decade a significant rise all over the continent (Ignazi, 2003). In this new formation, often self defined as ‘**New Radical Right**’, culture has replaced race and what is propagated is not the superiority of the nation against others, but the right to cultural difference, or even the equality of each culture, which can be maintained only if cultures remain separated (Taguieff, 1994).

This also leads to a radical rejection of globalization and multiculturalism that challenges the cultural integrity of nations and local communities. In many cases, radical right agents adopt the narrative of the clash of civilisations (Huntington 1993) creating, thus, a new enemy, Islam.

These new forces do not reject democracy *per se*, but criticize parliamentary parties for betraying the ‘people’ and support the idea of a ‘direct democracy’ beyond ideologies representing the so-called ‘anti party parties’(Crepon, 2010). According to this new postwar master frame that combines ethnonationalism, cultural racism and anti political establishment populism, extreme right parties mobilize on xenophobic and racist public opinions without being stigmatized as racists and adopt anti establishment strategy without being stigmatized as anti democrats (Hainsworth 2000). Appealing, thus, to both the Right and the Left in the last few years, these have entered the parliament in various countries across the continent (Rydgren, 2005).

At the same time, recent European policies and mainstream political discourse in the field of migrant integration – concerning related integration and citizenship acquisition policies – may be conceptualised as a *new type of principled, liberal intolerance*. It is *liberal* by being associated with the values of autonomy and equality, democracy, and the health and stability of liberal societies. It becomes intolerant by reversing the pragmatic of old school tolerance, insisting that too much leniency may be *bad* for social peace and a sign of undue cultural self-doubt. As or when these challenges are

not only seen as challenges but threats, the liberal order becomes increasingly intolerant towards ‘too much diversity’ in its self-defence (Mouritsen and Olsen, 2012). For the nation to exist there must be some ‘out-group’ against which the unity and homogeneity of the in-group is tested. A possible co-existence requires the constant re-definition of the ‘We’ that must be distinguished from a ‘They’ that is geographically close (Triandafyllidou, 2011, 2012). The new case of principled intolerance towards ‘Others’, thus, is translated more into the anxieties and the crisis that the national self is going through, rather than the difference of the other.

1.2 Tolerance and Xenophobia in Greece

As for Greece, during the last 20 years the country has been rapidly transformed from a migrant sending to a migrant receiving country and currently about 0.8 million of its 11 million population is of foreign origin. Moreover, during the last three years Greece has been faced with a **European and international migration crisis**: while increasing numbers of people are fleeing war and poverty from Asia and Africa, the Greek Turkish border has become the main gate to Europe. The onset of the current financial crisis in early 2010 has deteriorated the situation. Unemployment grew dramatically among long term settled immigrants and working class natives (Triandafyllidou 2011). There has been an important increase in the crime rate and a generalized sense of insecurity in the centre of the capital of the country, while adding to this, extreme right wing groups have taken the situation ‘in their hands’. Departing from images and incidents taking place in the centre of Athens, an all the more xenophobic discourse started spreading and dominating the way public opinion interprets the ‘other’ living in the city. Large parts of society appear as prone to morally accept incidents of racist violence and hate speech (Christopoulos 2010).

Central to this change has been the **unprecedented rise of far right parties, actions and discourse in the public sphere**. LAOS (Laikos Orthodoxos Sinagermos- *The People's Orthodox Rally*), is considered to be an extreme right wing formation that won 5.63% of the vote in 2009 national elections and 7.14% for the elections for the European Parliament.¹ LAOS has participated in the provisional grand coalition government formed to deal with the crisis (from November 2011 till February 2012) thus further legitimising its position in the Greek political system. Golden Dawn, on the other hand, is a nationalist far right organization, whose members have been repeatedly accused of carrying out acts of violence and hate crimes against immigrants, political opponents and ethnic minorities. Golden Dawn, with a clear racist and Nazi political position, operates in certain ‘troubled’ urban areas in terms of ‘field work’ and establishes a state within a state offering security to local residents (Vernadakis, 2011). This radical organization won a seat in municipal elections in the city of Athens (5.3%)² and entered the parliament in 2012 national elections getting an 6,97% of the national vote. There are more organizations, underground groups and people expressing different versions of extreme right ideology and practice in the country (See Annex III).

For the purposes of the present paper, though, and while acknowledging the complexity of the terminological debate, we use the term ‘extreme right’ to refer to those two groups that exhibit the characteristics of nationalism, xenophobia (ethno-nationalist xenophobia), anti-establishment critiques and socio-cultural authoritarianism (law and order, family values) (Mudde, 2007).

As for the **nature of this new ‘radical right’ force in Greece**, it follows the above mentioned European tendencies. In their declarations, LAOS MPs and Golden Dawn representatives officially dissociate themselves from fascist ideas, but also from all parliamentary parties, which in their attempt to become ‘European’ have obliterated basic tenets of national identity.

What has brought the far right at the fore in Greece, however, is its xenophobic, often racist, stance concerning migration. The main political tenets of the party of LAOS focus on the migration issue, the

¹ <http://www.neolaialaos.gr/>

² <http://xryshaygh.wordpress.com/>

issue of security (law and order for a more powerful state) and defending the nation that has been tempered lately by ‘too much’ democracy and leniency exhibited by ‘liberal’ governments, including those of right ideology (Papadatos 2011). LAOS considers migration and coexistence with migrants a problem, attributes criminality and unemployment to migration, cannot handle issues of integration and those migrants who are not ‘legal’ and ‘useful’ must leave the country (Psarras, 2011).

According to Giannis Kolovos, the political scientist who is considered to be the theorist of the party, LAOS departs from the principle that we must respect every person whose identity differs from our own. In some cases, yet, the cultural difference is so unbridgeable that cannot but lead to the exclusionary principle of non integration- for instance, when it comes to the illegal immigrants having ‘inundated’ the city centre of Athens (Kolovos, 2010). As a result, absolute respect to difference leads to racism as it precludes rapprochement and merging. New radical right thinking appropriates liberal concepts in politically correct terms so as to distort them (Georgiadou, 2010). In the same context, Golden Dawn’s members organize anti immigrant rallies and are accused of violent racist attacks; the party’s leader, however, blames the state and Europe for the situation in the city centre, while proclaiming his party to be not an extreme right, but a nationalist and anti capitalist force (Christopoulos, 2011).

This recomposition of the extreme right in the country runs in parallel with a conservative unfolding of Greek identity and a generalized political crisis unfolding in the 1990s, since when sensitive issues of national identity have re emerged and national particularities surfaced as the opposite pole to reform and globalization (Psarras 2010, Ellinas, 2011). Such a tendency seems severely intensified during the current crisis. However, **the relationship and dynamics between the extreme right discourse and mainstream public opinion, party and official state discourse in Greece has not been thoroughly studied.**

1.3 Case studies and Research Questions

The present paper departs from the assertion that **a key point in examining this issue is the concept of tolerance**³, which is used to draw boundaries and spaces of difference shedding light on the way ‘our’ identity is defined as compared and contrasted with the ‘other’. However, tolerance is not a self-consistent concept and has never enjoyed a unified meaning across time, nations and cultures. Instead, it is a concept dynamically shaped by context and social realities (Brown, 2008). It seems that we cannot conclude with certainty whether there is more or less tolerance in one country, as societies constitute rather discursive fields in which different positions fight with each other about what should be tolerated/ accepted and what not (Brown, 2008; Schiffauer, 2012, forthcoming). This also implies that statements about limits of tolerance are often used to position a speaker within the discursive field.

For instance, the boundary-drawing or positioning function of tolerance is particularly relevant in political life as it cuts across the left-right wing dimension. Tolerance is a liberal value and as such it is attractive to progressive people at the left wing of the political spectrum who are more open to ethnic and religious diversity and to what is defines as ‘egalitarian tolerance’. Egalitarian tolerance involves making room in the public space for minority and immigrant groups that have in the past suffered by stigmatization and marginalization (Galeotti, 2002). However, tolerance is also a neoliberal value that is appealing to people more in the right wing of the spectrum as it puts the native group in the role of majority that tolerates (in the minimal, liberal sense of allowing to be without suppressing) minority and immigrant groups (King, 1998).

This study explores the recent discourses on diversity and tolerance in Greek political life. It investigates what has been defined by different political actors as intolerable, tolerable or acceptable

³ We use the term tolerance to speak of the concept while the term toleration to speak of the practice, the applied attitude that people or institutions may adopt.

cultural difference – hence it questions what intolerance/tolerance/acceptance means for each actor and how they re-define and use it to draw boundaries in Greek society. These boundaries cut across and overlap with different dimensions: natives/nationals and Others/aliens, tolerant and intolerant people/parties, racist and non-racist, democratic and authoritarian, right wing vs. left wing forces.

The boundary drawing process between what is tolerable and what is not is characterized by contradictions and unclear answers, as it seems related less to the problem of difference of the other per se and more to the fears and concerns relating to difference. We examine here the political and discursive deployment of toleration in two different case studies and see how tolerance relies on the construction of images of ‘ingroup’ and ‘outgroup’. Our main scope is to gain a better understanding of why and when some aspects of difference are rejected. We seek to answer the question what kind of difference is tolerable/acceptable in Greek society and why? We also examine whether Greek society is becoming more or less tolerant towards specific groups and why.

Map 1: Map of the City of Athens (National Institute of Social Sciences, 2011)



Note: In white the 6th District Council where racist violence has been proliferating in the last 1.5 year, and the Panepistimio Square where the Muslim public prayer took place.

The first case analysed in this study refers to the public prayer of Muslim inhabitants of Athens on 18 November 2010 on the occasion of the ‘Id festivity (end of Ramadan) before the sprawling courtyard of the country's main university as a peaceful protest for the non existence of an official mosque (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2009; Antoniou 2005); this protest event provoked a public debate, the first on the issue to acquire visibility at the national level and took place without problems. The second case study concentrates on a tragic event that took place a few months later. In May 2011, in the very centre of Athens a 44-year old man, Manolis Kantaris, was cold blood assassinated by unknown people, believed to be irregular migrants. This murder triggered a series of violent and racist attacks against migrants in the city centre, and especially the 6th city council district that were led by far right wing organizations, such as the Golden Dawn, and tolerated by both the police and part of the

residents of the area. These incidents, our second case study, produced a polarised political discourse focusing around the crisis in the city centre as linked with the issue of irregular immigration.

In those two cases, the social practice of toleration was played out in the historical centre of the capital, where deterioration of living conditions has been followed by considerable irregular migration flows (see Map). The above events have generated discussions and conflicts in national politics regarding more generally migrants and the immigrant ‘Other’ in Greek society and the limit of his/her presence in public. While the political and symbolic exclusion of the immigrant Other is nothing new in Greek society (see also Psimmenos 1995; Triandafyllidou 2001; Maroukis 2009), what is new is how concepts of tolerance/intolerance and actions of toleration or lack of toleration are newly negotiated amidst a generalized economic and political crisis. The emergence of migration as a centre-stage political issue in the last two years and the spectacular rise of the far right wing vote (role of far right parties brings these questions and by the emergence of far right parties strong enough to win seats in the Parliament and in Athens municipal council. These political developments have brought racist and intolerant discourse (and actions) centre-stage in the debate on migration.

This report investigates how the concept of tolerance is mobilized when actors are confronted with ethnic and religious diversity. The first event in particular concentrates on the issue of religious diversity and to what extent Greek society proved tolerant of its public manifestation and of difference in general. The second event is characteristic of the current insecurity-diversity-intolerance triplet that has been proposed by far right wing actors and has increasingly gained legitimacy in Greek mainstream political discourse.

We particularly examine whether conceptions of what is or should be intolerable, tolerable and accepted/respected differ in each case and why. This report analyses how tolerance and intolerance are (re)presented in the discourse of the various parties involved; how intolerance and anti migrant discourse voiced by far right wing actors is integrated into mainstream official discourse and legitimated in terms of public opinion

1.4 Methodology

1.4.1 Material

Our case study included **both desk research and empirical fieldwork**. We have analysed the scholarly literature on the issue of the far right in the country, while also collecting material on far right wing parties and groups active at the moment in the city centre. We also examined newspaper materials: We searched for articles in five mainstream newspapers with the highest circulation at the national level (notably *Kathimerini*, *Vima*, *Eleftherotypia*, *Ethnos*, *ta Nea*) and in a selection of far right groups’ websites⁴. The search topics were: public prayer, Muslim prayer, Muslim prayer in front of the University, Kantaris, Kantaris’ murder, migrants’ pogroms, pogroms in the centre, attacks against migrants, for the period between November and June 2010. Moreover, we examined how the major political parties present in the Greek Parliament in 2011 (Conservative party New Democracy, Socialist party PASOK, left wing party SYRIZA, the Greek Communist Party KKE, the far right wing party LAOS and the Golden Dawn party that was not represented in the national parliament but whose actions and discourse were important for our selected case studies.

Desk material, thus, has been used so as to set the picture of the events and positions taken, while **our object of analysis were qualitative interviews** conducted with actors actively engaged in the events under question. We have conducted 19 qualitative interviews with representatives of right and left wing groups and migrant associations more active in the events aforementioned, as well as with

⁴ From a list available in Annex III, we consulted the following four websites: www.thermopilai.org, www.eglimatikotita.gr, www.defencenet.gr, www.metopo.gr, www.e-grammes.gr

residents of the city centre that have not taken active part in those conflicts but see themselves affected by immigrants' presence. More specifically, as regards authorities, four Athens Municipal Councilmen have been interviewed: one from the governing coalition ('Right to the City', socialist party PASOK- and leftist party DHMAR), one from the opposing coalition (previously in power, 2000-2004, 'Athens, the Town of our Life', right wing party New Democracy- far right party LAOS), one from the coalition supported by the non communist left party ('Open City'), and one from the 'Greek Dawn' far right party. Moreover, a radical right (LAOS) MP was interviewed.

We have also interviewed the Hellenic Police Press Spokesman and three individuals engaged with media (two journalists, one newspaper and one TV presenter and one writer contributing in newspapers and free press). Concerning civil society representatives, our respondents include others: the president of *Medicins du Monde Greece*, a clergyman, president of *Christian Solidarity and Charitable Fund of Athens Archdiocese*, the President of *Muslim Association of Greece*, the president of *Afghan association in Greece*, a citizen of immigrant background, who had participated in a hunger strike for migrants' legalization in 2011, a head teacher of a primary school populated by a majority of children with migrant background, a founding member of a local committee for the protection of the city centre, the president of *Athens' Chamber of Hotels*, a member of an antifascist coalition and a member of an architectural group doing voluntary work in the centre of Athens. Given that the official and public role of the majority of those actors has been quintessential in our analysis, anonymity is not always feasible.

We followed a structured interview guide and all interviews ranged between half an hour and 45 minutes. The topics list was standardised for all respondents: after asked about the events per se (if they were informed on these, how they perceived them and what is their stance towards them), all respondents were asked two blocks of questions, one regarding tolerance as emerging from the public Muslim prayer event and, the other, on racism and xenophobia as emerging from the events following the murder of a citizen in the city centre. This guiding scheme, however, was used in a flexible way, as the order and phrasing of the questions did not always follow the same sequence (for the list of interviewees and the questionnaire followed see Annex I).

1.4.2 Frame Analysis

We decided to adopt the **critical frame analysis** as the methodology for our study. According to Goffman, frames are schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences within their life space and world at large. By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective (Goffman, 1974). Frame analysis has been used first by scholars studying New Social Movements, but it soon proved to be a useful analytical tool kit for a variety of disciplines. It concerns the (re)construction and negotiation of reality by social/political actors through the use of symbolic tools (Triandafyllidou and Fotiou, 1998) and it is often depicted as a dynamic and emergent process occurring in interaction with the larger political culture, public discourse and dynamics of collective action. When it comes to the investigation of collective action, frames function 'as accenting devices that either underscore and embellish the seriousness and injustice of asocial condition or redefine as unjust and immoral what was previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable (Benford and Snow, 1992).

Framing processes allow for the definition of the self and the opponents, in short for the definition of the 'Us' and the 'them' category (Tilly, 2003); however, we opted for this approach also for the following reasons.

Firstly, this report aims at studying the complexities and explicit or latent contradictions in actors' argumentations over tolerance; interpretative frames allow examining the ways in which social actors use competing or convergent frames to (re)construct a specific cultural orientation which favours and

justifies their own policy positions, even when departing from the same reality or similar ideological cores (Triandafyllidou & Fotiou, 1998).

Moreover, when it comes to the analysis and interpretation of the recent rise of xenophobia and racism in Greece, frame analysis seems to deal with inconsistencies of other approaches. Cases studies often attribute the rise of extreme right wing forces to their privileged media promotion and their contradictory discourse, the decrease in political trust and the high level of unemployment, deep economic troubles and rise in migration (Georgiadou, Psarras 2011). Through such readings, however, on the one hand, one is tempted to reduce the rise in intolerance in public life to the critical action of a few agencies, such as extreme right wing forces, while, on the other, *explanans* with *explanandum* merge and determinism emerges as the key interpretation (Rugdgen, 2005).

On the contrary, what is at issue is the manner in which grievances are interpreted, diffused and framed through action. Without denying the presence of discontent, frame analysis as applied in social movement studies, tends to give more leverage to the capacity of social actors to interact with contextual opportunities and constraints. This way, analysis focuses on the ‘political-cultural or symbolic opportunities that determine what kind of ideas become visible for the public, resonate with public opinion and are held to be “legitimate” by the audience’ (Kriesi, 2004, p. 72). By accounting exactly for this process and not for the final outcome of attributing meaning to external realities, frame methodology can shed more light in the rise of xenophobia and racism in contemporary liberal democracies.

Furthermore, as our discussion revolved around debates on migration and diversity policies, we also explore how the debate on diversity and (in)tolerance has evolved as a ‘policy problem’ through reconstructing the framing of these issues within the political arena. For this reconstruction, thus, we also adopt insights from the *policy frame method*, which attempts to study how an organising principle transforms fragmentary or incidental information into a structured and meaningful policy problem, in which a solution is implicitly or explicitly enclosed (Verloo, 2005, Triandafyllidou and Fotiou, 1998). In the policy process, what is important is to see what is represented as the problem and the different assumptions that underpin such representations (Roggeband, 2007, p 4).

Given the widespread stigmatization of racism and the establishment of liberal democracies in post-war Europe, concepts as diversity and tolerance are widely endorsed by the majority of actors. Differences arise when it comes to the identification of what constitutes in each case ‘the problem’, who is to blame and what is the preferred course of action for addressing the ‘problem’. It is for this reason that we apply the methodology of frame analysis, which focuses on the process of the attribution of meaning that lies behind the emergence of any conflictual event. There are different stages of this process when it comes to collective action analysis, such as the recognition of certain incidents as social problem, then of possible strategies which would resolve these, and, lastly, the identification of motivations for acting. Snow and Benford (1988) defined those steps as the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational dimensions of framing.

Taking into account these different dimensions, the paper is organised as follows. The following section explores the case studies under question and the issues these raise in relation with the concepts of tolerance and intolerance. Section 3 presents the positions adopted by the political and social actors interviewed and how these were justified in each case. The report is structured along the two major competing frames emerging from our analysis. In the concluding section, we bring the findings together with a view to highlight new conceptions of intolerance in the national public sphere.

2. Tolerance and (in) tolerance in Greek public life: Framing the Two Case Studies

This paper examines the competing frames adopted by different societal actors concerning issues of tolerance of (religious) diversity and (in) tolerance of racist actions and speech as these were played out in the public space of the capital of the country between 2010 and 2011 in two different case studies.

2.1 Introduction

2.1.1 Cases

On 18 November 2011, Muslims of all nationalities, mostly immigrants from the Middle East, Africa and Asia, gathered in Panepistimio square in central Athens to pray and celebrate Eid al Adha (an honour to the sacrifice of Abraham). The public prayer was organized by the Muslim Association of Greece. Women and children were allowed to pray in a specially designated area of the square. Taking place without problems, the event was positively endorsed by authorities, political parties and media that tolerated religious diversity as manifested on that day in the city centre. Even Church representatives demanded from the state to manage the issue of the right to religious freedom for those people living in the country.⁵ LAOS opposed this public expression of religious difference, while members of Golden Dawn and other far right groups led violent incidents in Attiki Square in their attempt to cancel the event. ‘Greece has been transformed into a country of tolerance due to passivity, fear against reactions, lack of self respect and self esteem’,⁶ observes a far right blog post.

Six months later, in May 2011, after the assassination of a 44 year old man and without having evidence concerning the nationality of perpetrators, a series of violent and racist attacks against migrants evolves in the very centre of Athens, led by ultra right wing groups and tolerated by both police forces and part of the residents of the area. The days following the murder, far right wing supporters would go after and beat passing irregular migrants and asylum seekers down town,⁷ while in some cases, Golden Dawn’s members, as well as other individuals, filmed those attacks, which spread in the internet and TV.⁸ Those violent incidents took place on the open urban city spaces around the areas of Aghios Panteleimonas, Aharnon, Patision, Plateia Vathis and Attikis (6th municipal district of Athens). The next day, a 21 year old man from Bangladesh lost his life after being stabbed at Kato Patisia under unclear circumstances. Security representatives attributed this racist attack to the 44-year old man assassination. All parliamentary parties condemned both the event of the murder, as well as the racist violence that erupted in the city centre. This was also the line followed in the media coverage. However, the focus was put on the uncontrolled situation and rise of criminality in the city centre that was directed linked with the influx of migrants;⁹

⁵ We demand the building of a lawful Mosque, *Eleftherotypia*, 17 Nov 2010, <http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=224594>

⁶ Muslims occupied for hours the city centre, 20 February 2011, http://www.defencenet.gr/defence/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=17708&Itemid=86, see also Islamic prayer next to the monument of Grigorios E, *Chrisi Avgi*, 16 November 2010 <http://xryshaygh.wordpress.com/2010/11/16/%CE%B9%CF%83%CE%BB%CE%B1%CE%BC%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AE-%CF%80%CF%81%CE%BF%CF%83%CE%B5%CF%85%CF%87%CE%AE-%CE%B4%CE%AF%CF%80%CE%BB%CE%B1-%CE%B1%CF%80%CF%8C-%CF%84%CE%BF%CE%BD-%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%B4%CF%81%CE%B9/>

⁷ http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xevip5_yy-yyyyyyy_news

⁸ <http://omniatv.com/open-publishing/news/308>

⁹ Mihalis Katsigeras, Beyond regime, *Kathimerini*, 11 May 2011, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_ell_1_11/05/2011_441739, Kostas Pretenteris, They took Athens from us, *Ta Nea*, 11 May 2011, <http://www.tanea.gr/empisteytika/?aid=4630465>

In relation to the public prayer issue, it is worth noting that Athens is the only European capital that does not yet have a formal mosque operating in the city or in its immediate surroundings. This has been the case since the foundation of the Greek state even (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2009). The growing number of practicing Muslim immigrants in Athens from South Asia, Africa and the Middle-East pray in informal prayer rooms. Dozens of these makeshift mosques have been set up in the capital in apartments, shops and garages mainly accumulated in the city centre. At the same time, at several occasions there have been reported in mainstream media attacks by ultra right wing groups against those places of worship (graffiti displacing hate speech or the symbol of swastika, fire bombings, attacks etc- *reference*) . Religious diversity resulting from immigration has emerged as a challenge only during the past few years, as Asian Muslim groups have increased in size and have started raising claims regarding their religious needs (Triandafyllidou 2010). Reflecting the lack of wider integration policy towards economic migrants, **the November 2010 event of massive public prayer raised the question of how much toleration can be publicly manifested and endorsed nowadays in Greece.** Actually the public prayer was a silent but quite loud claims-making on the part of Muslims of Greece that they need to have their religion accepted in the public space, through the official construction of a mosque in Athens.

The racist attacks down town following a case of murder in May 2011 examine to what extent acts or words of racist violence can be tolerated in the country's public life, especially at a time when irregular migration is coupled with high unemployment rates and deteriorating living conditions for the majority population. The city centre and especially the 6th municipal district constitute an area that, since 2008, has been receiving political and public attention, domestic and international, as racist violence incidents have been taking place there on a regular basis. In terms of anti-racist legislation, the only piece of specific legislation in place regarding racist crime is the anti-racism Law 927/1979 'on punishing acts or activities aiming at racial discrimination' (Annex IV). This also contains an article (2) referring to criminalization of hate speech.¹⁰ International organizations have repeatedly reproached national authorities for inefficient anti racist legislation in theory and in its highly problematic application in practice.¹¹ Since 2009, there has been a rise of hate speech by –not only ultra right wing- social and political agents that goes unaccountable. At the same time, no official case of racist violence and crime has been recorded on the basis of the relevant anti-racist penal legislation (law 927/1979). There has never been a conviction for crimes related to racist motives, even if national and international NGOs and institutions have presented documented cases of racist attacks, especially in the city centre, while in many cases the perpetrators reported are police officers (UN Refugee Agency Greece, 2012). This case raises issues of intolerance towards migrants in Greece and conversely of tolerance and toleration of racist discourse and violence.

2.1.2 Frames

A first reading of the interview texts revealed that all respondents share some common assumptions. All depart by acknowledging that tolerance is an inherent principle of a democratic life and by condemning words and practices of racist nature as illegal and inhuman practices. Moreover, when it comes to the phenomenon of intolerance in public life, all actors criticize politics and the political establishment. On the other hand, political and social actors develop **different positions** regarding how much toleration or non toleration can be allowed and manifested in public space. Concerning the

¹⁰ There are also soft law articles (*Kodikas Deontologias*) who proscribe the transmission of racist and xenophobic messages by radio and television (RAXEN 2010)

¹¹ See European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) Annual Report on Greece (2009) <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-by-country/greece/GRC-CbC-IV-2009-031-GRC.pdf> last accessed on 23 February 2012; United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Greece (2009) http://www.nchr.gr/media/keimena_diethnwn_organismwn_kai_forewn/diethneis_ektheseis_gia_ta_dta_stin_ella/CERD_2009_en.pdf last accessed on 24 February 2012. Plus Plevris

Muslim public prayer, there are two positions emerging, that *(religious) diversity in public space must be tolerated* and the other that *religious diversity should not be tolerated*, which in some cases becomes *Islamophobia*. When it comes to our second case study, one way to argue is to *Justify/ Tolerate Racism* and the other *Not to Tolerate Racism*. In an attempt to classify the above actors and frames (Table I, Annex II), we came to the conclusion that those defending the latter also fall into the *tolerating (religious) diversity* frame, while those understanding the May events as an issue of *justifying/ tolerating racism* also opt for the *intolerating (religious) diversity* frame –except for two more ambiguous cases. We may say, then, that there are two competing positions emerging from this first *diagnosis* analysis: ***Tolerance of Diversity- Intolerance of Racism and Intolerance of Diversity/ Islamophobia- Tolerance/ Justification of Racism.***

In order to understand, then, how actors drawing from the same assumptions end up unravelling different positions, the section that follows concentrates on the way actors organise their arguments and represent their positions. This analysis brings to light five frames prevailing in the interview texts:

- a) the **political/ ideological** framing, that explains tolerance and intolerance towards diversity as political choices towards the question of co existence with the other
- b) the **identity/cultural** framing, namely the underlying assumption that national cultural identity is an objective reality that defines public life
- c) **Law and order** frame according to which public life is interpreted as a matter of legal rights
- d) **Anti establishment** frame, namely the appeal to a critique over power that attributes social problems to all stakeholders irrespectively of political identity or ideological position
- e) **Crisis** frame that apparently subjects all aspects of national life under the perspective of the current not only financial severe crisis that the country undergoes

The first two frames emerge through the interviews as competing and define how actors place themselves with regard to the events under examination. The other three more frames are operationalized as strategies depending on respondents' positions and develop in different directions in each case. As a result, the analysis will be divided in two sections studying the two major competing frames and how these define the way our two case studies are read and represented. In each section we will examine first how the concept of tolerance towards religious diversity is framed departing from the event of the public prayer; then, with regards to the violent attacks of May 2011, we will attempt to explore what is represented as the problem and the different assumptions concerning victims/ perpetrators, causes and solutions to the problem that underpin such representations.

2.2 Political/ Ideological Frame

This frame explains words and actions taking place in public space as choices made by citizens on how to live their lives in relation with other people and power structures. In this sense, it is a political/ ideological frame, as politics here is taken to refer to power structured relationships maintained by institutions, mentalities, historical contexts and people and as such is not confined to institutions or political parties, but pervades every aspect of life (Foucault 1991, Kauffman 1990). Those interpreting events under this frame come up with the following positions: regarding the public prayer they defend a 'tolerance of (religious) diversity' stance, while regarding the racist attacks downtown in May 2011, they object racist attitudes and words and call for intolerance of racism.

Drawing from the values of democracy, social equality and multiculturalism so as to justify their position, those respondents could be situated in the 'left' tag of a left/ right cleavage. Social cleavages are social and cultural dividing lines that oppose the interests and identities of different groups in society, while the left/right one has been used mainly by political scientists to explain electoral

behavior. However, this traditional cleavage was challenged by the emergence of a larger number of mainly sociocultural issues in post industrial societies (Kriesi *et al.* 2006, Kitschelt 1994).¹² A new dimension is often labeled as new politics involving conflict over environmental and minority rights, participation, social and gender equality. As such, it represents the cleavage between proponents of these issues, the New Left, and citizens who feel threatened by these issues, the New Right (Dalton, 1996). For the purpose of this paper, we maintain the Left and Right labeling that still shapes ties between people and groups that broadly define with the same cause (Diani 1995). At the same time, we consider Left and Right as terms responding to contemporary circumstances and, thus, amplified to include varying aspects of the New Left and the New Right.

Apart from the representative of the leftist coalition, respondents falling into this category also include interviewees who are not self defined as of a leftist political ideology, such as a journalist, those representing migrant communities, the president of the *Medicins sans Frontieres* and other civil society representatives.

2.2.1 Public Muslim Prayer and the Framing of Tolerance

Tolerance as a political/ ideological value

To begin with, there was no problem whatsoever in Muslims conducting their religious duties in open public space, as this is a right they are entitled to. Tolerance of religious diversity is a duty of any democratic regime that the Greek state has not observed.

Accepting religions different than the majority one is a basic principle and duty of every liberal democracy, which has not been put into question by the national political system. So, a part of our co-citizens, who believe in various versions of Islam, decided to protest in public space for their constitutional right (for the construction of a Mosque) and they were right in doing so.

Having said that, the municipal councillor that represents the leftist coalition justifies her position not based on constitutional provisions, but on her political ideology.

It has to do with the standpoint from which we choose to see the events in ideological terms. I speak from the leftist point of view: for us, migrants are the wretched of the earth; they are part of labor class, at the lower level of social strata in terms of rights labor, welfare state provisions and the rest. As a result, the Left must deal with the victims of the crisis with a common strategy...putting a priority on those suffering the most from injustice, going through exploitation, those uprooted, poorer than the poor. We do not classify people according to their country of origin. That is why the Left has always been before all an antifascist agent. (Interview 3)

This is the first strategy used to justify the position of tolerance, namely the **appeal to a political and ideological culture** that considers diversity to be not a problem to be resolved but an added value for a democratic society to be actively defended.

Multiculturalism is not an issue under question, it is reality. The question is to understand that as a gift, not a problem, it depends on how you decide to see it, then the school may appear as a disadvantage, if you take advantage of the languages, of the different cultures and civilizations, if there is infrastructure and planning, then all, all that becomes a wealth (Interview 16).

¹² For instance, it is thought to be less meaningful after the emergence of New Social Movements in the 1970s and 1980s touching upon a new set of issues (Koopmans, 1996) or the emergence of the 'new right' characterized by exclusivist attitudes and anti establishment appeal combined with a market/ liberal position (Giugni and Passy, 2004).

But it is not just the leftist political ideology justifying the ‘tolerance of diversity’ position; there are interviewees defending tolerance as part of democratic values, citizenship ethics and duties towards the ‘other’.

Why is there a rise in xenophobia, when all those years migration offered so much to Europe and Greece in terms of economic prosperity? Well, now, we enter into the political field, into the domain of ideology, how we want our world to be, how we want to construct it, it would be naive to wish to live in a society all together, like Christmas slogans, without looking deeper what must change. And in order for things to change, things must change, in education, in schools...It is the huge responsibility of the democratic citizen, not just of the progressive one, there is an urgent need to participate and to be alert, to fight for the co existence in urban space... (Interview 16).

This is not a principle stemming from legal duties or political parties’ positions, but part of a political/ideological choices about how to relate with the other in public sphere and **how one wishes the world around him/her to be**. In this sense, it is also the Church representative who seems to end up in the same perspective over diversity, even if departing from a different principle, the ‘Love Thy Neighborhood Christian’ standpoint:

The Church in Greece aims at two things: first, how people who have been caught under surprise by the abrupt change internalize that they have to accept the other, that the thing that he is a stranger does not mean he will distort our identity, than he will negatively influence us, no...We must not tell people depending their background...and then, we must help alleviate those next to us, no matter where they come from, they are people in need...(Interview 10)

Tolerance not enough, beyond tolerance

The church representative, however, hesitated to frame the issue under question using the terms ‘toleration’ and ‘tolerance’, as these may lead to a problematization of migration and diversity instead of treating these as enriching elements of a whole culture and people, as they entail:

...a negative connotation, they usually mean that somebody has harmed me and I just tolerate him, but this was not the issue, this person just stands next to me and happens to be different, this is not an issue of tolerating.

Tolerance is on the one hand endorsed in the name of values, such as equality and respect of diversity; at the same time, it is the **political/ideological framing of tolerance questions the limits of the concept**.

Respondents seek to broaden the concept so as to endorse a positive interpretation of multiculturalism rather than the classical ‘negative’ attitude of toleration towards difference. This is done through the strategy of *frame amplification* (Benford and Snow, 2000), which is a term derived from social movement analysis to describe the process of drawing from a concept to further amplify it.

Toleration means that I tolerate something...I think I disagree with this term, because it is not related with notions as integration, solidarity, which means that I want the other to treat me as I treat him, this is a question of values, it means I love the other person next to me, I care about him, and I want to help him throughout this period of his life, as I would like him to do If I were at his homeland.

Tolerance is not defended as a legal and immutable principle, but **as value conditioning social relations and promoting values, such as, for instance, gender equality**. In this sense, it should be problematized taking into account the role of women as victims and Muslim men are perpetrators of a legal abuse. Unequal gender relations must not go unabated in the name of ‘multiculturalism’.

If tolerance and/ or acceptance of difference refer to violence against women, because that is a specific cultural or national tradition, well, this is a problem we cannot ignore. The delinquent act of abusing a woman must be reported to the police and the position that women are inferior to men must be ideologically contested. Tolerance among cultures must not be equated with the lack of dialogue or with the avoidance of conflictual situations. There must be both tolerance and rights for all (Interview 3).

In this quote, through the *law and order* 'master frame' the concept of tolerance is criticized and then amplified so as to better address everyone's rights and satisfactorily address contemporary forms of cultural diversity within a multicultural society.

2.2.2 Racist Attacks and the framing of Intolerance

Framing tolerance as a political/ ideological issue leads respondents to adopt two discursive strategies in relation to the May 2011 violent events; **the first is to deny that racism is a national identity problem and rather link it to a class dimension. The second is to investigate the phenomenon trying to identify what is the problem and what is to be done.**

Racism as a class issue

Condemning the event of the murder, respondents point out that this could have been committed both by native and migrants due to the deterioration of living conditions in the city centre.

Racism is not racial, but (a behavior) of the most powerful towards the impotent, it is pauperization that is repulsive for the people, not their color, migrants, homeless people; we will shortly hear about incidents of violence against Greek people, we already do! I care about residents of the city centre who sleep in a paper box in the streets, no matter where they come from...how they will gain access to their right to housing, health, labor, culture, cleaning services (Interview 15)

Those suffering from racist violence are not only, or principally, labeled or seen as 'migrants', but as 'this increasing group of marginalized people, those people living in poverty', as a member of an antifascist coalition comments. Respondents falling into this frame category emphasize that a crucial aspect of racist violence is intolerance towards anything different, including native people.

When you are poor, homeless, dirty, one cannot tell where you come from, and you will soon be a victim of racist discrimination, you will not be allowed to enter into fast food restaurants to go to the bathroom, and then violence will be the next. Today it is Muslims, because they are different, it used to be the Albanians, now not anymore, tomorrow it will be the unemployed. (Interview 10)

Those responsible for racist violence or discourse are not only extreme right people, groups or parties, the police and the state, but also those tolerating xenophobia. This brings us to another key discursive strategy in the construction of frames: identifying the **victims and the perpetrators** (Roggeband, 2007).

Greek society is phobic towards not only the 'foreigner', but in general the 'other', the different, even when he or she is of the same nationality. The recent rise in racist violence in Greek public life did not come as a surprise, then since the views that

'prioritize *us* against *them* are actually the only players in town, not even the left opposes them (..) People from various neighborhoods reacted against the construction of a Mosque in the same way as they have reacted against a migrants' centre or against drug addiction centers, so even if we say that we are hospitable, we are not at all tolerant (Interview 7).

Problematization of Racism

As racism is not an issue of different nationality (culture/ identity), then the problem arising from the May 2011 events is the criminalization and stigmatization of migrant communities and the fact that racist violence was tolerated, if not justified by local residents during those May 2011 days. For people holding dear values as tolerance towards diversity, intolerance of diversity/racism is not a natural reaction of a threatened national majority against non nationals, but a choice over how to relate with the 'other' and society.

The fact that we are an intolerant society is something that came about. I do not believe in racial theories, some people believe that it is in our DNA to be tolerant, and that we are a hospitable people. But when we were faced with the problem, it became apparent that we are a fearful people and we proved ready to close the door to the migrant...as we close the door to the drug addicted and so on (Interview 7)

In the same sense, not all people going through harsh living conditions resort to intolerant attitudes towards the 'other'.

There are people who are racists, who before that (events) did not let that be expressed in public; now they do. But there is a very big part of Greek society that even today has nothing to do with racism and xenophobia, people who love the other, who care, who believe that it is not the others to blame for the crisis, and do not accuse the migrants and the refugee for what is happening to them (Interview 16)

Attributing to racism an ideological character leads respondents into looking for the various political/ social causes that contributed to the rise of the phenomenon. There is an anti establishment critique which highlights inefficient EU and state migration policies, municipal authorities' neglect and police xenophobic performance, along with the crucial role played by the mainstream media.

In line with the above problematization, respondents proceed to articulate what they consider as solutions to the problem and their own personal call for action concerning the issues at stake- what is called in frame analysis *prognosis and motivational* step. On the one hand, there are specific suggestions with regard with the city centre crisis, such as the construction of night shelters and health provisions for homeless people, drug treatment policies, development of an efficient system for monitoring racist violence and others. The state is called upon to adopt a more preventive than restrictive role, as 'more policing or legislative measures will do no difference' (Interview 10). On the other hand, extreme right ideology becomes widespread as it is 'attractive putting the blame always on the other'. What is considered by respondents to be important is citizens' personal mobilization showing that the ideological/ political framing of the issues also decides where the responsibility lies for the way the 'other' and 'us' co exist.

2.3 Identity/ Culture Frame

This frame **attributes social practices and discourse uttered in public life to the culture and identity of individuals and groups involved**. This emphasis on the identity, which points out to an attempt to define the self and the opponents based on nationality (Tilly 2003), is rather common when it comes to public discourse on immigration. This is done by putting emphasis on the cultural (and not civic) identity defined by the category of nation and which is appearing as beyond and above politics and irrelevant to ideology. The positions taken by respondents framing their arguments as such are the following; concerning the public prayer 'intolerance of (religious) Diversity' and with regard to the May 2011 violent incidents down town 'justification or tolerance of Racist words and Actions'. The identity/ cultural framing is exemplified in the reaction of LAOS's president towards the violent

events of May 2011 in the centre of Athens: ‘At some point, we have to get rid of all ‘those’ in order to save the Greek citizen.’¹³

Touching upon the issue of co existence with the nationally and culturally ‘other’, the assumption underlying these positions is that there is a distinction between the autochthonous ‘us’ and allochthonous ‘them’. The different language, religion or customs of minority populations are seen by the national majority as threatening to the latter’s presumed cultural and/or ethnic purity (Triandafyllidou, 2012). Such a framing presents ‘us’ as a unified group united by a common national background and which by default should be protected against ‘them’, who even if they have arrived here from various destinations and for different reasons and live under different circumstances, however, they become a homogeneous group since they threaten national cohesion.

Apart from the far right representatives, this framing is also adopted by municipal councillors from other political parties the police spokesman, journalists and civil society representatives, who are not self defined as far right or right wing people, but consider **this negative and threatening representation of minorities an intrinsic feature of the majority-minority relationship.**

2.3.1 Public Muslim Prayer and the Framing of Intolerance

All interviewees acknowledge that tolerance is an inherent value of any democratic regime and it goes without saying that they accept it. Then, respondents framing their arguments in terms of identity and culture use two strategies to unfold the way they perceive tolerance and to justify their intolerance of (religious) diversity.

We tolerate ‘them’ as long as this does not clash with ‘our’ rights

The first strategy is to acknowledge the need to tolerate ‘other’s’ rights only to the extent native people’s rights are not threatened and public order is maintained. An affirmative stance, thus, that soon retreats into a restrictive view of the notion of tolerance.

Tolerance cannot be put into question, it is part of every civilization; it goes without saying and towards all differences. But I disagree with the public prayer, religion is a sacred thing, so we have to respect them, but they should themselves respect their own institution! What was that, praying in the middle of the street and provoke the people...In this country, there must be at last some kind of order established! You cannot do as you wish, if that is the case, then go back to your country!

The protest event performed by the Muslim community is criticized on the basis of being a provoking action that could have potentially incited disorder and encouraged fanaticism.

Public order, then, is maintained by rejecting whatever may differ from the dominant religious expressions and in this way the concept of religious tolerance is severely limited.

In this context, the crisis frame is also operationalized so as to prove that values, such as tolerance, are highly irrelevant when the majority population is faced with economic and social insecurity.

When the Greeks have to contribute 30-40% of their wages in order for the state to survive, they are called to contribute also for those people who for their own reasons decided to enter in here. Greece is facing its own problems, very serious ones, so serious that there is no time to think whether we can be tolerant towards other things or not. If the problem of massive and

¹³ G. Karatzaferis commenting the murder, 10 May 2010, <http://www.ethnos.gr/article.asp?catid=22768&subid=2&pubid=63033038>

uncontrolled move of people from other countries and civilizations continues, then intolerance will increase (Interview 6).

Tolerance defines the terms of co existence with the non nationals as long as national identity and well being are safeguarded and not conceived as vulnerable. This framing subsumes tolerance (and intolerance) to the Us and Them dichotomy.

This kind of intolerance is not however peculiar to this period of economic crisis in Greece. For instance, another respondent argues that all religious events, Muslim or Orthodox, must be forbidden in public in the name of secularism. However, this limitation of religious tolerance is itself subject to a further limitation: **Migrants first have to adapt to the legal and cultural context of the country that hosts them and, thus, abstain from claims over religious and cultural diversity. It is only after that, that their right to protest will be recognized** and their quest of tolerance (not acceptance though) can be listened to.

‘It is self evident that Greece has an identity, a Christian identity, which preexisted and the migrant must adapt, ‘when in Rome, do as the Romans’ (Interview 9).

In the name of the native majority’s wellbeing tolerance should be legally and institutionally limited. In line with this, respondents propose the following course of action: tolerance is not inexhaustible, but feasible and desirable only when referring to a limited number of different people.

Greece has to deal with an unprecedented problem; no other country has accepted such a big number in such a short time, so this became a problem. There should have been a limited number of people, which could be tolerated, because every town can put up with a certain number of them, this can be calculated, but it did not happen this way (Interview 2).

This position introduces the position of intolerance and emphasizes the limits and preconditions of toleration and the restrictive role of the national state. The same is argued in the name of migrants’ rights through the use of the law and order master frame: the wellbeing of the majority population is safeguarded by making sure migrants have legal, social and religious rights and this can be secured only for a limited number of newcomers.

Migration is not a right, we must not give the right to everyone who wishes to come to enter Greece and get a job and stay forever. We must check how many we could have, where to canalize them, what kind of jobs they could do, but, at the same, time, make sure that all of those, whom we already have, are given labour and social rights, a decent presence in the country. Otherwise, too much tolerance can lead to imposition (Interview 8).

Prioritizing the ‘us’ as against ‘them’ framing of religious or cultural diversity, enables respondents talk about tolerance while arguing for intolerance of (religious) diversity.

It is ‘them’ who cannot be tolerated

On the other hand, intolerance frame is sustained also based on another assumption, that ‘the capacity of integration that people with such a different cultural and educational background, norms of hygiene and mentalities, have is limited’ (Interview 2). In this case, it is not a matter of accepting, amplifying or restricting principles of our democracy, it is about the ‘other’ who cannot or does not want to be integrated and, thus, tolerated by us. To begin with, a distinction is made between the first (from the Balkan region, former ex communist regimes) and the second wave of migrants (sub Saharan Africa and Middle East), where

‘the first, the Balkans, had a lot in common with Greeks, our cultures were similar, there was no real multicultural attempt, we cannot compare those cases with people from Africa and Southeast Asia’ (Interview 6)

This argument is further explained in the following quote:

It has become apparent that people from the Third World cannot integrate into the Western World; it becomes difficult due to their background, not difficult, impossible. Due to the lack of institutions, the man from Bangladesh is able only to sell flowers in the streets, which is a parasitic labor according to Western criteria, and he is not willing to channel his skills in another way (Interview 8).

This way, the blame for racist violence is put on the migrants themselves, and not on the Greek society. According to another respondent, the latter has been proved tolerant in the case of second generation Albanians, for instance, who ‘not only speak Greek, but they cannot even speak Albanian, they are totally assimilated!’ If migrants wish to be tolerated, they, thus, must not differ from the native community; otherwise it is them, who put limits to tolerance.

Accepting tolerance in theory, while arguing that it is minorities who cannot be tolerated is a discursive strategy also achieved through the operationalization of law and order master frame, this time when touching upon **gender inequalities. Reject tolerance in the name of Muslim women’s rights enables the political representative of the populist right party to reverse his argument and argue for intolerance exactly in the name of tolerance.**

Tolerance simply means that you cannot deprive my rights, simply because I tolerate you! And tolerate what? Female excision? (It means) To let me live freely without imposing me your own mentalities, tolerance means there are institutions in my country, there are laws and you did not come here so to change those and impose your own, you must follow my rules. Perform your religious duties, if you wish, but (allow you to) carry out genital excision to women? I will never tolerate that! (Interview 4)

In this case gender rights are operationalized not only so as to prove ethically wrong the concept of tolerance, but also so as to reject a culture that is seen only as subordinating women and legitimating violence. In the following case of a journalist interviewed, this argument introduces the position of ‘Islamophobia’:

The other day in Paris I saw a woman wearing chador, full face, I mean. I looked at her with evil feelings, I would have called the police, this is forbidden by the law in France. Even if this takes place with her consent, it is a human’s blockage and it is forbidden. In this sense, zero tolerance! (Interview 8)

Both the radical right and the extreme right party political representatives believe that it was unacceptable to legally allow the event of the public prayer on the basis of it being Muslim. *We are heading to a violent Islamization of Europe, jihad, whoever reads history is aware of that* (Interview 4). Politicizing the cultural gap between minorities and autochthonous populations makes the migrant population responsible for bridging the gap and for any intolerance incidents that may occur.

There are various kinds of difference. Female genital mutilation is a painful one. Letting your children drop from school is an unacceptable one, and in Greece it is an illegal act. So, Roma people residing in the national region must understand this -even if they do understand, we are the ones who ignore it- they break the law in every single step of theirs! And when their children attend the school, they behave in such a way they become marginalized, some people says that this is racism, but if they behave in this way, what would they expect? They provoke a reaction! (Interview 8)

Tolerance as a liberal democratic principle is abolished as soon as human rights issues come into play and with this priority in mind intolerance and, what’s more, Islamophobia and phobia against the ‘other’ is introduced in politically correct terms and rational argumentation. What lies behind such a rationale, however, is the unquestionable priority of the national cultural self over migrant identities.

This is how those respondents framing the event of the public prayer as a cultural/ identity issue end up arguing for intolerance of (religious) diversity.

2.3.2 Racist Attacks and the Framing of Tolerance

Respondents framing racist attacks as a cultural/ identity issue on the one hand treat diversity as a problem to be resolved and, thus, interpret those events as showcasing the difficulties arising from such a problem, while they also use the strategy of objectifying incidents of racism.

Problematization of Migration and Diversity

The massive influx of immigrants in the country, along with the recent economic crisis and the feelings of generalized insecurity for the population of Greece are factors taken into consideration by all respondents. Under the ‘cultural/ identity’ frame, however, these are linked casually so as to accentuate the ‘us and them’ dichotomy.

Greece went through a problem no other country went through, no other has accepted such a big number in such a few time, and of course this naturally created a problem, because there is a huge number of people who came with different mentalities, different mindsets, different daily lives and culture, daily customs and hygiene (Interview 2).

While talking about violent clashes in the centre of Athens, one respondent repeated four times in his interview that we cannot expect from local people to tolerate all those migrants, whom, in any case, ‘nobody invited to come here, all those who came massively and without the consent of local society’. While condemning racism as an illegal and inhuman act, he departs from the assumption that diversity is per se a problem that naturally provokes negative reactions.

There is an over accumulation of migrants, there, the environment is purely multicultural. Local residents, thus, reacted. And one could of course justify their reaction, since this was a purely closed local society some years ago and it has been called upon to coexist with so many different nationalities! People were agitated seeing all those people in the streets of the neighborhood they used to know so well. That is not easy.....even if we accept that a multicultural society is a positive feature (Interview 6).

This appears a legitimate conclusion to draw if one takes a look at the circumstances dominating the city centre during the last two years. A journalist describes the situation as an *explosive* one using the words *alienation, collapse, fear, criminality, violence, isolation, and pauperization, threat*, while linking the problems of delinquency, drugs, and violence with migration.

The whole human geography of the area has changed, the area itself is so different and Greek residents live as ‘freely besieged’ people, they lock up in their apartments. A woman that has learned for 70 years in the row to live in an urban environment so abruptly changed will feel threatened, that is natural (Interview 9).

This way, the murder of the citizen and the subsequent racist attacks against migrants in the centre of Athens are used **to construct diversity as a problem**. The uncontrolled immigration and the illegal influx of massive numbers of people in the city centre emerge as the causes of rising criminality and delinquency down town and this is a situation that people cannot bear, as admitted by the political and social actors adopting this frame.

Non politicization/Objectification of racism

Following this argumentation, then, racism becomes a symptom of the generalized crisis caused (also) by massive illegal immigration. According to a journalist interviewed, racism is due to the uncontrolled influx of migrants, the defragmentation of the urban landscape, the abrupt change of the familiar environment and the subsequent criminality. Explained as a natural consequence of social reasons, then, racist attacks are not labeled as an alarming phenomenon to worry about, but as a 'reaction to some certain actions'. This normalization of racism through the cultural/ identity frame is well reflected in the following words:

It is logical for people to look for exit for their feelings of wrath, they will look for scapegoats...Our society is impressively tolerant, but now people logically react and direct their reaction against them (Interview 13).

The above becomes highly legitimated by the 'law and order' frame that justifies xenophobic attitudes as reactions against insecurity and for the safeguarding of public order. In this way, the majority population instead of being the perpetrator is now turned into a homogeneous victim. Even the municipal councillor representing the centre/ left coalition while fiercely condemning racist attitudes considers these as a mere symptom of the generalized insecurity.

I empathize with locals...when (fascist) groups of people appear in their door and provide them with security, what can they do, them, Mrs Giorgos who owns the grocery shop, Mrs Maria who sells fruits, they fear of the 'foreigner', of the 'other', so...(Interview 1)

In other cases, the law and order frame transforms the very acts of racist violence into a self defense action that means to protect native peoples' rights: 'how can people resist extreme right wing ideas and practices, when 300 people are illegally entering the country on a daily basis and violate their rights?' (Interview 13)

As conflicts between migrants and natives are objectified and racism is naturalized, it is implicitly stated that there is no problem with the dominant culture and society. This also explains why people framing the issue as a cultural/ identity problem through the 'us' and 'them' dichotomy react negatively when asked if Greek citizens are racists or if there is such an issue in the country. These violent incidents do not reflect a conscious political or ideological choice, but a natural reaction and logical channeling of peoples' anger and fear, and cannot, thus, be considered as racist, they argue. The extreme right wing (Golden Dawn) party representative reassures that Greece has always been a hospitable country when it came to some foreigners, but this was a 'true invasion'. When asked his opinion on the violent incidents down town, another respondent summarizes the strategy under examination:

No, there is no racism here, these are exaggerated assumptions, these were simply the adjunct consequences of a phenomenon that is so difficult to deal with... and if there is, this is not a political or ideological problem, racism is ideological, here it is not like in other countries, there its nature is ideological, rigid, military based, there are criminals there...you cannot call this little lady from the (Ag. Panteleimonas) neighbourhood, who went out in the square screaming a slogan a racist, of course not, what is happening in Greece is unprecedented (Interview 2)

Stressing the 'us' versus 'them' dichotomy leads to the operationalization of the murder of a Greek citizen so as to justify or even tolerate intolerant and racist attitudes against migrant populations. When asked their opinion about these racist attacks down town, some respondents reversed the question, as the spokesmen of far right wing party did when answering:

There is racism against the Greeks. Crimes against Greek people are silenced by mainstream media, even if these are much more. I consider it a mistake on your behalf not to have included a relevant question in your agenda (Interview 5).

3. Concluding Remarks

To summarize, the two competing positions emerging from the interview texts, *Tolerance of Diversity- Intolerance of Racism* and *Intolerance of Diversity/ Islamophobia- Tolerance/ Justification of Racism*, correspond to two competing framings, the political/ ideological and the cultural/ identity one.

More precisely, those arguing along a political/ ideological frame sustain a tolerant position towards diversity and an intolerant one when it comes to racist words and acts. Even if only one interviewee explicitly attributed her choice to a 'leftist' ideology, however, all respondents defended what we could call 'new left' values such as minorities' rights, equality and diversity according to a 'left/ right cleavage'. Tolerance is endorsed in the name of this framing, but at the same time is proved limited to reflect accommodation of diversity in contemporary multicultural settings. Racism is perceived as a problem not to be tolerated and respondents attempt to erase the differences raised between 'us' and 'them' situating the framing on the 'them' tag of the 'us/ them' cleavage.

Those framing the events as cultural/ identity issues, on the contrary, put forward the 'intolerance of diversity' position, while justifying if not tolerating racist attitudes. The latter category insist on the non political/ ideological nature of their standpoint and present it as apolitical, as a non option, but, instead as a natural reaction to the problem of migration. Within this framing, racism is a mere symptom of the problem of migration and tolerance accepted in theory but severely limited in practice due to the 'us/ them' dichotomy. Prioritizing national identity and culture, thus, those frames could be situated on the 'us' tag along an 'us/ them' cleavage and on the 'right' tag of the 'left/right' cleavage as they prioritize national cultural identity over the 'other's' rights, without questioning their liberal values and beliefs in a modern society (see Table I and Table II, Annex III).

As seen above, **both frames use the law and order master frame, as well as the anti establishment critique frame, so as to develop their competing positions.** For instance, state migration policies have been either lacking or inefficient and EU regulations contributed to the explosion of the problem. Concerning particularly the city centre, many of our respondents, including party representatives and the extreme right representative, claim that the first to blame is not the migrants themselves, but the state, along with all parliamentary parties, politicians and authorities, that did nothing to prevent or deal with the issue. Moving even further, the populist right representative puts the blame for uncontrolled migration to the exploitation of the Third World countries by the multinational companies and the dominant economy.

These strategies adopted when dealing with the issue are rather unexpected and resemble more to those arguing along a political/ ideological frame. There is, then, something like a basic understanding for immigrants at a first sight between those supporting the two competing frames (Caiani and Wagemann, 2006). However, the difference becomes visible through a frame analysis looking for the construction of the problems under question.

On the one hand, those arguing for intolerance through the **law and order master frame** examine the 'lamentable' phenomenon of massive immigration in terms of the effects on local people, public image and economy, without taking into account the rights of the immigrants themselves, or without rating 'their' rights equally with 'ours'. The victims of criminality and lawlessness are first and foremost local residents of the central areas of Athens. Even if respondents acknowledge that immigrants' rights are abused, however their public presence in the area puts native people's security further at risk as this is already the case due to economic harsh situation- using in the same way the crisis frame. **So, even if the law and order frame is presented as a non political way to classify and understand social reality, it is however constructed in ethnocultural terms that define the political identities of 'us' vs 'them' in the national public sphere.**

In the same way, the **critique of political power** that both frames share, presupposes different understandings of what is the 'problem' and who is considered to be the perpetrator, the agent of

change and the possible solutions. The cultural/ identity frame attributes the role of the agent of change to the state; at the same time, however, it constructs ‘them’ as a homogeneous category that is so different than the national self that co existence becomes a cultural problem. So, the dominant culture is not to blame, while it remains unclear how the state could have resolved what seems to be natural conflicts and unbridgeable cultural differences. Even if respondents pay lip service to tolerance during the interview, the solutions suggested through this frame are quite intolerant. In other words, there is an inconsistency between the goals formulated on the one hand and the analysis of the problems that require a solution on the other. For instance, the representative of the radical right party attributes the problem of the public prayer to state’s neglect over building a Mosque; soon afterwards, however, he denies any possibility of tolerating Muslim culture, a culture that rejects women’s rights. While both positions include the same criticism against power, voiced even by those representing power structures, however, the **cultural/ identity frame attacks power holders in the name of quite different criteria as it is framed in ethnocultural terms** (Simmons, 2003).

Across Europe and along with the rise and gradual legitimization of ultra right wing rhetoric, **hate speech is often disguised in the name of liberal values so as to exclude individuals from citizens’ liberal rights**. A new principled intolerance is seen, paradoxically, as necessary to protect the rights of individuals, and the rights, values and the identity of the majority. Greece is experiencing (already in the past years but particularly so in spring 2012) an unprecedented rise of far right parties, along with a notable spreading of incidents of racist violence and xenophobic discourse in the public sphere. The actual presence of the ‘other’ in need next to the nationals, who are also through a time of crisis, renders the issue of tolerance into a central political challenge to be thoroughly examined.

The contradictory diagnoses of the ‘problem’ notably the political and principled framing of the problems by reference to tolerance (if not necessarily acceptance) of diversity and rejection of racism; and the identity framing where all issues are subsumed to a fundamental dichotomy between Us and Others (we cannot tolerate others if their presence is perceived to harm our material or cultural well being. There are no principles that hold here – the interest of the ‘ingroup’ is the utmost priority) are however solved by the strategy of objectification.

Our frame analysis suggests that competing versions of reality and of the ‘good’ are reconciled by presenting ‘intolerance’ positions as apolitical and logical reactions towards an ‘objective’ reality. Thus, with the exception of a few clearly left-wing and pro-diversity interviewees, most others, including those who would classify themselves as faithful to equality and democracy, use the law and order frame to justify and legitimize intolerance and racism. This strategy of objectification is also adopted to strengthen the culture and identity frame: it is ‘natural’ that the world is divided into ‘us’ fellow nationals and ‘them’ others. Exclusion, inequality, intolerance, even racist violence can be justified when what is at stake is the perceived interest or well being of the national ingroup.

We may call this type of intolerance as the new nationalist intolerance – a further variant of what Olsen and Mouritsen have labeled the new liberal intolerance. There is an analogy between the two sets of arguments. Principled liberal intolerance

‘is liberal by being associated with the values of autonomy and equality, democracy, and the health and stability of liberal societies. It reverses the pragmatic of old school tolerance, insisting that too much leniency may be bad for social peace and a sign of undue cultural self-doubt, and that values and virtues may in fact be implanted in recalcitrant minds. It implies that liberalism as a social and institutional order and form of civic subjectivity is vulnerable, should be defended, and needs active promotion, so that not leaving people alone is good. It censures, or at least increases the human and social costs of sub-scribing to cultural and religious practices and ‘values’, which are deemed threatening to liberal societies. And it defines as undesirable such groups that are seen as predominantly illiberal, who have their access and/or residence possibilities restricted as a consequence. (Olsen and Mouritsen 2012: p.15)

Principled national intolerance may be defined as follows:

It subscribes to the values of the nationalism doctrine, notably that the world is naturally divided into nations and that nations need to preserve their political autonomy, ethnic purity and cultural authenticity. Anyone who casts doubt on this view of the world and of the nation puts the nation into danger. In addition anyone, like migrants do by definition, who violates the fundamental principle that cultural and ethnic boundaries should coincide with political ones puts the nation to danger. Indeed national intolerance can already be found in the work of A. Sayad on the paradox of alterity (Sayad 1991). Migration is deemed threatening to society. The best way to protect the nation is to restrict the rights of migrants or better to expel them altogether.

What is particularly worrying in Greece is that such discourses of principled national intolerance (and racism) are increasingly seen as justified and legitimized by reference to an 'objective' reality. They thus push the far right wing discourses centre-stage.

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ANNEX I: Qualitative Interviews

Authorities

Athens Municipal Councilmen

- 1) **Kouveli Maria**, lawyer, ('Right to the City', PASOK-DHMAR), Migrant Integration Council chairwoman
- 2) **Skiadas Eleftherios**, journalist, ('Athens, the Town of our Life, New Democracy-LAOS), Vice Mayor and chairman of the Centre for *Solidarity* with the Homelessness of the City of Athens during 2007-2010
- 3) **Eleni Portaliou**, University Professor of Architecture, ('Open City', SYN), founding member of Network for the Political and Social Rights
- 4) **Nikos Mihaloliakos**, teacher of mathematics, ('Greek Dawn', Golden Dawn), leader of Golden Dawn

LAOS representative

- 5) **Kyriakos Velopoulos**, journalist, LAOS MP, Thes/ki

Police Unit

- 6) **Athanasios Kokkalakis**, Police Lieutenant, Hellenic Police Press Spokesman

Media

- 7) **Dimitris Psarras**, journalist, 'Ios tis Kiriakis' (Sunday's Virus) *Eleftherotypia*, author of '*Karatzafaris' secret hand - the television resurrection of Greek Extreme Right*' (2010)
- 8) **Soti Triantafyllou**, writer, translator, contributing often in *Ta Nea* and *Athens Voice* (free press)
- 9) **Giannis Pretenteris**, TV presenter *MEGA*, journalist, *To Vima*, *Ta Nea*

Civil Society

- 10) **Nikitas Kanakis**, doctor, president of *Medicins du Monde Greece*
- 11) **Vasileios Havatzas**, clergyman (Church S. Efthimios Kipselis), president of *Christian Solidarity and Charitable Fund of Athens Archdiocese*
- 12) **Dimitris Nikolopoulos**, coordinator of *KIIIOKA* (Mobilization of Citizens for the Centre of Athens)
- 13) **Giorgos Tsakiris**, President of *Attica Hotel Owners* and of the *Athens' Chamber of Hotels*
- 14) **Giannis Albanis**, Network for Political and Social Rights, founding member of *NEVER AGAIN* (anti fascist coalition for the centre of Athens)
- 15) **Giannis Vlahakis**, architect, *Architects' Group of the Mobilization of Residents of the 6th municipal district of Athens*
- 16) **Naim Elntagour and Anna Stamou**, President of *Muslim Association of Greece/ Public Relations Manager*

17) **Yunus Mohammadi**, President of *The Afghan Association in Greece*

18) **Hasan Kazbua**, ex hunger striker

19) **Stella Protonotariou**, head teacher of 132nd primary school of Athens

Questionnaire

Case Studies

-What happened then (1,2,3) and what was your stance on that?

-What do you think about the immigration issue in Greece? How is this reflected in the city centre of Athens? (How is the current crisis related to it?) Which would be the way to deal with it? Is there a European dimension to it?

On Tolerance

-Do you think the Greek society is tolerant towards cultural/ religious diversity?

-What do you think tolerance towards diversity mean? And how is this translated in daily life?

-Does the current crisis affect the issue of migration?

-Is Greece more or less tolerant than other societies?

-Do you think a cautious/ intolerant discourse related with immigrants is more relevant nowadays than it was some years before? Why?

On Racism/ Xenophobia

-How would you describe a xenophobic/ racist discourse/ action?

-How do you explain the rise of extreme right wing parties/ groups in Europe?

-How do you explain the rise of extreme right wing parties/ groups in Athens/ Greece?

-Will the current crisis affect issues of racism/ xenophobia?

ANNEX II

Tables

Table I. Frames (4)/ Actors (19)

Actors	Frames	Tolerate (Justify) Racism	Intolerance of Racism	Tolerance of (religious) diversity in public	Islamophobia
Municipal A (centre-left)		x		x	
Municipal B (right)		x			x
Municipal C (left)			x	x	
Municipal D (extreme left)		x			x
MP (populist right)		x			x
Church representative		?	x	x	
Security Forces		x			x
Journalist A			x	x	
Journalist B		x			x
Journalist C		x			x
NGO (medicins sans frontiers)			x		?
NGO (citizens' security)		x			x
NGO (antifascist coalition)			x	x	
Civil society (hotel owner represent.)		x			x
Civil society (teacher)			x	x	
Civil society (architect)			x	x	
Immigrant community repress. A			x	x	
Immigrant community repress. B			x	x	
Immigrant			x	x	

Table II

Politics/ Identity Cleavage

	Politics Cleavage	New Left	New Right
Identity Cleavage			
Us			
Them			

ANNEX III: List of Ultra Right Wing Sources

It is difficult to map and classify the ultra right wing ‘movement’ in Greece as a linear process and well articulated list of groups and people. What we can do is find the links between groups- political initiatives and ad hoc associations, blogs, press, editorial houses, well known individuals, and TV shows, as well as the points of convergence between fascist discourse and parliamentary extreme right wing agents.

Ultra Right Wing Groups

LAOS <http://laos.gr/>, <http://www.neolaialaos.gr/vouleutes/>, <http://www.neolaialaos.gr/>

Χρυσή Αυγή <http://xryshaygh.wordpress.com/>

Autonomous Nationalists (*Aftonomoi Ethnikistes*) <http://ediktyo.gr/>

National Front (*National Front*) <http://ethnikometopo.gr/>

National Alliance (royalist *Ethniki Simmahia*)

Greek Front (*Elliniko Metopo*), MP LAOS Makis Vorides,(editorial house) www.e-grammes.gr, www.metopo.gr

Patriotic Front (*Patriotiko Metopo*) <http://www.pamet.gr/>

Black Swan (*Mavros Kiknos*) <http://mavroskrinos.blogspot.com/>

Ardin (*Ardin*) <http://www.ardin.gr/>

Ultra Right Wing Blogs

<http://redskywarning.blogspot.com/>

<http://egklimatikotita-allodapwn.blogspot.com/>

<http://www.eglimatikotita.gr/>

<http://www.patriwtes.gr/>

<http://hellenicrevenge.blogspot.com/>

<http://www.thermopilai.org/>

<http://olympia.gr/>

<http://www.afipnisis.gr/>

<http://ellinikiafipnisis.blogspot.com/>

<http://www.resaltomag.gr/>

<http://enantion-olwn.blogspot.com/>

<http://www.greekalert.com/>

<http://patriotismos.wordpress.com/>

<http://ellinikoistologio.blogspot.com/>

Ultra Right Wing Press

Alpha Ena (*Alpha Ena*- weekly press release of parliamentary party LAOS) alpha1.gr

Free World (*Eleftheros Kosmos*) elkosmos.gr
Free Time (*Eleftheri Ora*- daily release by pro junta Mihalopoulos) elora.gr
Golden Dawn (*Chrisi Avgi*- weekly) <http://xryshaygh.wordpress.com/>
Counterattack (LAOS youthsection) <http://resistance-hellas.blogspot.com/>
Patria, <http://www.patriamag.gr/>
National Front (*Ethniko Metopo*) <http://ethnikometopo.gr/>
Target (*Stohos*) <http://www.stoxos.gr/>
Greek Lines (*Ellinikes Grammes*) www.e-grammes.gr/

Local groups are not present in the net, some leaflets available in hand and information through other sites (e.g. *local committee of America Square, Angelopoulou, Viktoria Square, of the Museum district, and of the cultural association 'The Friends of Kipseli'*)

List of Anti Racist and Human Rights groups and NGOs

Aitima, <http://aitima.gr/>
Antifascist Coalition NEVER AGAIN
ARSIS, Social Organization for the Support to the Youth, <http://www.arsis.gr/>
Babel Day Centre, http://www.syn-eirmos.gr/Sub_vavel/index_s.html
Doctors of the World (MdM Greece), www.mdmgreece.gr
Amnesty International, www.amnesty.org.gr
Network of Social Support for Refugees and Immigrants, <http://migrant.diktio.org/>
Hellenic League for Human Rights, <http://www.hlhr.gr/>
Group of Lawyers for the Rights of Refugees and Migrants, <http://omadadikigorwn.blogspot.com/>
Greek Council for Refugees, www.gcr.gr
Greek Helsinki Monitor, www.greekhelsinki.gr
Greek Forum of Refugees www.migrant.gr
Klimaka, www.klimaka.org.gr
Metadrasi, www.metadrasi.org
The Greek Ombudsman, www.synigoros.gr/allodapoi
Ecumenical Refugee Programme
Praksis, www.praksis.gr
Movement 'Expel Racism', www.ksm.gr/kar
Hellenic Action for Human Rights, <http://www.hahur.com/>
Anti Racism and Fascism Initiative, www.antiracismfascism.org

Institute for Rights, Equality and Diversity (i-red), www.i-red.eu/

Youth against Racism in Europe (YRE), <http://www.yregreece.blogspot.com/>

ANNEX IV

Law 927/1979

The sole expressly anti-racism statute in Greece remains that of **Law 927/1979**, as amended by Law 1419/1984 and Aliens Law 2910/2001. Law 927/1979 is a criminal law statute entitled “on punishment of acts or activities aiming at racial discrimination”. The substantive provisions of this Law consist of three articles which refer to different but interrelated subject-matters:¹⁴

Art.1

1. anyone who publicly, orally or in writing or through pictures or any other means intentionally incites people to perform acts or carry out activities which may result in discrimination, hatred or violence against other persons or groups of persons on the sole ground of the latter’s racial or ethnic origin or religion (by virtue of article 24 of Law 1419/1984) is punished by imprisonment for a maximum of two years and/or pecuniary penalty or both;
2. The above-mentioned penalties are dealt with by the same provision in cases where someone establishes or participates in organisations that aim at organising propaganda or activities of any form whatsoever, leading to racial discrimination.

Art.2

To express publicly, either orally or by the press or by written texts or through pictures or any other means offensive ideas against any individual or group of individuals on the grounds of the latter’s racial or ethnic origin or religion. The penalty provided for in this case is imprisonment of a maximum of one year and/or pecuniary penalty.

Art.3 (abolished and substituted by art.16 of law 3304/2005)

The initial art.3 of the latter included provisions about fines and sanctions against those discriminating during provision of goods and services on the grounds of ethnic or racial origin. The law 3304/2005 by art.16 has extended protection to victims of sexual orientation by providing that

‘whoever violates the prohibition of discriminatory treatment on grounds of ethnic or racial origin or religious or other beliefs, disability, age or sexual orientation, during transactions regarding provision of goods or services to the public is punished by imprisonment of six months and up to three years and with a fine from 1000 up to 6000 Euros.’ The motives of the crime are taken into account when determining the sentence so racist motives can be considered as aggravating circumstances. According to the article 23 of Law 3719/2008, amending article 79 of the Criminal Code (Presidential Decree n.283/1985), committing an offence on the basis of, inter alia, ethnic, racial or religious hatred is considered an aggravating circumstance.

Art.71.4 of the law n. 3386/2005) provides ex officio prosecution of acts of racism and xenophobia as described in the law n.927/1979.

¹⁴ Quoted in RAXEN Thematic Study (2010) and in N. Sitaropoulos, Transposition in Greece of the European Union Directive 2000/43 implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, available http://www.mmo.gr/pdf/library/Greece/Sitaropoulos_GR-RACISM.pdf

